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Are adverse selection models of debt robust to
changes in market structure?




Many adverse selection models of standard one-period debt contracts are based on
the following seemingly innocuous assumptions. First, entrepreneurs have private
information about the quality of their return distributions. Second, return
distributions are ordered by the monotone likelihood-ratio property. Third,
financiers’ payoff functions are restricted to be monotonically non-decreasing in
firm profits. Fourth, financial markets are competitive. We argue that debt is not
an optimal contract in these models if there is only one (monopoly) financier
rather than an infinite number of competitive financiers.
Key words: security design, adverse selection, monotonic contracts, monotone
likelihood ratio, first-order stochastic dominance
JEL classification numbers: D82, G354
Ovatko haitalliseen valikoitumiseen perustuvat
velkasopimusmallit robustisia markkinarakenteen
muutoksiin nähden?




Useat velkasopimusten optimaalisuutta selittävät haitallisen valikoitumisen mallit
perustuvat seuraaviin näennäisesti ei-kriittisiin oletuksiin. Ensiksikin vain yrittäjät
tietävät investointiprojektiensa tuottojen todennäköisyysjakauman. Toiseksi ja-
kaumat voidaan asettaa paremmuusjärjestykseen ensimmäisen asteen stokastisen
dominanssin perusteella. Kolmanneksi rahoittajien tuottojen täytyy olla ei-vähe-
neviä projektien tuottojen suhteen. Neljänneksi rahoitusmarkkinat ovat kilpailul-
liset. Tutkimuksessa esitetään, ettei velkasopimus ole optimaalinen näissä mal-
leissa, jos oletus kilpailullisista rahoitusmarkkinoista korvataan oletuksella, että
monopolirahoittaja on yritysten ainoa rahoituksen lähde.
Avainsanat: rahoitussopimusten teoria, käänteinen valikoituminen, monotoniset
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1 Introduction
One strand of the security design literature
1 focuses on deriving the conditions
under which the standard debt contracts are equilibrium financial contracts in
adverse selection models. The main result of this literature, whose principal
contributions are Innes (1993), Nachman and Noe (1994) and Wang and
Williamson (1998), is that debt contracts are uniquely optimal financial contracts,
when the following four key assumptions hold. First, entrepreneurs have private
information about their return distributions. Second, higher quality borrowers
have better return distributions in terms of the monotone likelihood ratio
property.
2 Third, financiers’ admissible payoff functions are non-decreasing in
firm return. Fourth, financial markets are competitive. In this paper, we show that
debt contracts are not optimal in Wang and Williamson (1998), if the seemingly
innocuous assumption of competitive financial markets is replaced by the
assumption that the monopoly financier is the only source of finance. More
importantly, we argue that other adverse selection models of debt, which satisfy
the four key assumptions, are likely to fail in the same robustness test.
The idea that debt financing may alleviate the problem of asymmetric
information between the firm and its potential financiers has its origins in the
pioneering work of Myers and Majluf (1984). Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that
debt financing minimises the underpricing losses from security issuance when
there is asymmetric information on the value of the firm’s current assets.
However, as an explanation of the optimality of debt contracts their model has the
shortcoming that the admissible securities consist only of debt and equity. To
remedy this problem, the subsequent research has tried to generalise the results of
Myers and Majluf (1984) by examining optimal security designs in asymmetric
information models when contracts are endogenous.
When contracts are endogenous, the standard contract theory suggests that
optimal contracts should be contingent on all relevant information. This generally
implies that optimal contracts will be extremely complex (see Hart and
Holmström 1987). However, most real world financial contracts are rather simple.
The security design literature examines what kind of assumptions must be made,
for example, on the nature of information and on the distributions of project
returns to ensure that some simple contracts such as standard debt contracts are
optimal. The central finding of Innes (1993), Nachman and Noe (1994) and Wang
and Williamson (1998) is that only some seemingly mild and innocuous
                                                
1 This literature is surveyd in Dowd (1992) and Allen and Winton (1995).
2 For debt to be uniquely optimal (pooling) contract in Nachman and Noe (1994), the return
distributions of different types must be ordered by the strict conditional stochastic dominance,
which is a somewhat stronger condition than the monotone likelihood ration property or the first-
order stochastic dominance (see Nachman and Noe 1994, p. 18–21 for details).8
assumptions need to be made to guarantee that standard debt contracts are optimal
responses to the adverse selection problem.
Innes (1993) derives equilibrium financial contracts in competitive risk
neutral capital markets, where high quality entrepreneurs have better profit
distributions in the sense of the monotone likelihood property, and where
financiers know the distribution of quality types in the population but not the
quality of any particular borrower. The key result of Innes (1993) is that when the
entrepreneur’s investment size is fixed and when the financier’s payoff is
monotonically nondecreasing in firm profits, the equilibrium pooling contract is
the standard debt contract. The signaling model of Nachman and Noe (1994)
differs from the screening model of Innes (1993) in that informed borrowers try to
signal their quality to financiers by their contract offers. Nachman and Noe (1994)
show that the debt contract is the uniquely optimal pooling contract if and only if
the cash flows of different types of borrowers are ordered by the strict conditional
stochastic dominance (see ftn 2 below). Wang and Williamson (1998) introduce
ex ante screening to the two quality type –version of the model of Innes (1993),
and show that debt contracts are optimal separating contracts, when the
monitoring technology allows financiers to commit to stochastic ex ante
screening.
As our aim is to argue that the central results of the above models are not
robust to a change in the market structure, we first provide a stylised illustration
of the role of the key four assumptions in adverse selection models of debt.
A typical feature of adverse selection models with competition between
financiers (or insurers as in Rotschild and Stiglitz 1976) is that lower quality
borrowers have an incentive to mimic higher quality borrowers. In signaling
models, low quality borrowers have an incentive to offer similar contracts as
higher quality borrowers. In screening models, in turn, low quality borrowers have
an incentive to choose the contracts directed at higher quality borrowers.
Obviously, to reduce or eliminate the mimicking, financiers and higher quality
borrowers try to design such contracts for high quality borrowers that are
unattractive for lower quality borrowers. When project returns are ordered by the
monotone likelihood ratio property, higher quality borrowers’ returns are more
concentrated on the upper end of the probability distribution of returns. In that
case, low quality borrowers’ incentives to mimic higher quality types are reduced
when the contracts designed by or directed at higher quality types provide the
borrower relatively low payoffs with low project returns and relatively high
payoffs with high project returns. As shown by Innes (1994), Nachman and Noe
(1994) and Wang and Williamson (1998), when project returns are ordered by the
monotone likelihood ratio property and when the parties’ payoff functions are9
restricted to be monotonic
3, the competitive contracts designed by or directed at
higher quality types are the standard debt contracts.
It is rather easy to see that this explanation of the optimality of debt fails when
the monopoly financier is the only source of finance. The objective of the
monopoly financier is to extract all the expected project surpluses from borrowers.
A consequence of assuming that the project distributions are ordered by the
monotone likelihood ratio property is that lower quality borrowers’ projects yield
lower expected returns than those of higher quality borrowers. This implies that
when the types of borrowers are unknown to the monopoly financier, it is high
quality borrowers who have an incentive to mimic lower quality borrowers as the
financier can extract lower expected surpluses from lower quality types.
Obviously, to extract as much profits as possible, the monopoly financier designs
the contract(s) in such a way that high quality types’ benefits of mimicking lower
quality types are as low as possible. As higher quality borrowers’ returns are more
concentrated on the upper end of the return distribution, the financier offers
borrowers such monotonic contracts that provide them relatively high payoffs
with low return realisations and relatively low payoffs with high return
realisations. It is obvious that such contracts are very different from the standard
debt contracts.
In this article, we formalise the above argument by extending the model of
Wang and Williamson (1998). We show that their result of the optimality of
standard debt contracts is not robust to a change in the market structure. More
specifically, we show that the standard debt contracts are not optimal in their
model, when the only source of finance is the monopoly financier. We utilise the
model of Wang and Williamson (1998), because the intuition underlying our
results is easy to see in their relatively simple model with only two types of
borrowers. However, we emphasise that our argument is likely to hold also in
other adverse selection –based models of debt, which are based on the above four
key assumptions.
In Section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we examine the properties of
separating equilibria, characterise the specific form of profit-maximising
separating contracts, and compare our results to those of Wang and Williamson
(1998). Section 4 concludes.
                                                
3 In the absence of this restriction, the equilibrium contracts take the ‘live-or-die’ form (see Innes
1993) such that the financier receives all the returns if the return realisation is lower than some
threshold level and nothing if the return is at least as high as the threshold level.10
2 The model
There is one major difference between our model and that of Wang and
Williamson (1998). We assume that there is only one (monopoly) financier,
whereas Wang and Williamson (1998) assume that there is a continuum of
competive lenders. Otherwise, the models are identical except for some minor
differences.
There are three types of risk-neutral agents: type g borrowers, type b
borrowers, and the monopoly financier. There is a continuum [0,1] of borrowers
with the share of type g borrowers being  and the share of type b borrowers
being 1–. Borrowers are endowed with an investment project which requires k
units of funds to undertake, 0 < k < 1. Borrowers have no own funds and the only
source of outside funds is the monopoly financier. If undertaken, projects yield
random returns according to the distribution function Fi(x) and the corresponding
probability density function fi(x), where the subscript i denotes the type of a
borrower, i = g, b. We assume that fi(x) > 0 for x[0,1] and that fi(x) is continuous
on [0,1].
The following assumption is a typical way of ordering projects in adverse
selection models.
Assumption 1. Type g borrowers’ projects are better than type b borrowers’
projects in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio-property:
 . y x ; 1 , 0 y , x ;
) y ( f
) y ( f
) x ( f
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As shown by Wang and Williamson (1998), the following property is a
consequence of the above assumption.
Corollary 1. Type g borrower’s return distribution Fg(x) first-order stochastically
dominates type b borrower’s return distribution Fb(x). Thus, for every non-
decreasing function u:, we have (A1.1)
, ) x ( dF ) x ( u ) x ( dF ) x ( u b g  
and (A1.2)
. x every for ) x ( F ) x ( F b g 11
The first-order stochastic dominance implies, among other things, that any
expected utility maximiser who prefers more over less prefers Fg(x) to Fb(x) and
that the graph of Fg(x) is uniformly below the graph of Fb(x).
We assume that borrowers know their own types but the financier learns the
type of a borrower only by paying a fixed cost of screening, c. The screening
technology is such that it permits the financier to commit to screen only some
fraction of the pool of loan applicants. A similar assumption is utilised also in
Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Krasa and Villamil (1994) in the costly state
verification context.
There are three types of potential (monopolistic) equilibrium configurations in
our model. First, in the separating monopolistic equilibrium with a menu of
contracts the financier offers a menu of two contracts, and both types of borrowers
choose the contracts directed at them. In an alternative separating equilibrium, the
financier offers only one contract, which is accepted only by type g borrowers.
The third potential equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium, where the financier
offers only one contract and both types of borrowers accept that contract.
The time line of the model in the most interesting case, where the financier
offers a menu of two contracts, and both types of borrowers choose the contracts

















At date 0, the financier announces the available contracts. The contracts are
denoted by the pairs (Pi(x),i), i  =  g,b, where Pi(x) denotes type i borrower’s
payoff as a function of the project return x and where i,  i = g,b, denotes the
probability that the borrower who announces to be of type i is screened.
We constrain the payoff functions to satisfy the following critical assumption
which is standard in adverse selection models of debt.
Assumption 2. Borrowers’ and the financier’s payoff functions are constrained to
be monotonically nondecreasing in the project return x:
 . b , g i , 1 , 0 y , x ); y ( P y ) x ( P x and ) y ( P ) x ( P y x i i i i        
                                                
4 We show in Proposition 3 that the financier prefers a menu of two separating contracts to one
separating contract or to pooling contracts provided that the cost of screening is sufficiently low.12
One motivation for the use of the monotonicity constraint is provided by Innes
(1993, p. 30). He assumes that the borrower may be able to sabotage the firm ex-
post. That is, after observing a perfect signal of firm profits, the borrower may be
in a position to sabotage the firm by burning as much of the profits as he chooses.
Then, the borrower would choose to burn profits in any decreasing segment of
their payoff function and a non-monotonic contract would never be chosen.
5
At date 1, borrowers announce their types, that is, they inform the financier
which of the two contracts they would prefer to choose.
At date 2, the financier screens the borrower who claims that he is of type i
with probability i. We assume that the financier can commit to punish a borrower
who claims to be of type i but who turns out to be the other type by refusing to
lend to him
6. The financier obviously wants type i borrower to choose a type i
contract. The role of stochastic screening is to induce borrowers to self-select and
thus to choose the contracts targeted at them at the lowest possible screening
costs.
At date 3, the contracts are signed and the projects are started. At date 4, the
returns are realised and the payoffs divided between the parties.
The time line highlights two important features of our model. First, contracts are
signed before the projects are screened, which is in contrast with some of the
literature with ex ante screening (eg Broecker 1990). Second, screening takes
place before the projects are executed, not after project execution as in the costly
state verification models (Townsend 1979, Gale and Hellwig 1985). We argue
that this timing structure, although not typical in the literature, is reasonable in an
environment, where borrowers know their own types, where the projects of both
types of borrowers are socially efficient and where the financier can commit to
stochastic, perfect and costly ex-ante screening.
Finally, we make a simplifying restriction on the parameter values, which
allows us to restrict our attention on the self-selective separating contracts. In the
following assumption, parameters b, c and u denote, respectively, the mean
investment returns for type b borrowers, a fixed and strictly positive screening
cost and a fixed and strictly positive reservation utility level of borrowers.
                                                
5 See Innes (1993) for a discussion on the optimal financial contracts under adverse selection and
without the monotonicity constraint.
6 We assume that the financier can commit to use punishments which, in our static model, are not
credible ex-post. We assume that the financier uses these punishments to create and maintain the
reputation of being a tough financier. Of course, reputational issues cannot be satisfactorily
analysed in a static model like this. See Khalil (1997) and Khalil and Parigi (1998) for analyses on
optimal contracts when the principal cannot commit to an audit policy.13
Assumption 3.   . α) /(1 u α k, u µ min c b    
The requirement that c is lower than the first term in the parentheses requires that
the mean investment returns for type b borrowers satisfy  u c k b     . This
condition implies that both types of projects are socially profitable. The
requirement that c is lower than the second term in the parentheses is a technical
assumption, which greatly simplifies our analysis. This assumption requires that
the cost of screening must be sufficiently low, or, alternatively, that the share of
type g borrowers, , is sufficiently high. Besides simplifying our analysis, the
satisfaction of this assumption guarantees that the menu of separating contracts,
which is our main interest, always yields the financier higher profits than the
alternative contracts.
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3 Profit-maximising separating contracts
In this section, we derive the profit-maximising menu of separating contracts
under the assumption that the monopoly financier is the only source of finance.
We show that these profit-maximising contracts are very different from the
standard debt contracts, which, as shown by Wang and Williamson (1998), are
optimal in an otherwise similar model but with a large number of lenders. In
Appendix, we characterise the properties of the profit-maximising separating
contracts that attract only one type of borrowers and pooling contracts. In
Proposition 3 below, we also show that the profit-maximising menu of separating
contracts provides the financier bigger profits than the other alternatives provided
that the screening cost is sufficiently low.
3.1 Financier’s maximisation problem
By separating equilibrium with a menu of contracts we mean a pair of contracts
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(3.1)
                                                
7 Note that assumptions that are close to assumption 1 are widely used in adverse selection models.
In Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976), for example, the existence of the separating equilibrium requires
the the proportion of low-quality types is high enough.14
s.t.
 . b , g i ; 1 , 0 x , x ) x ( P 0 i     (3.2)
 . b , g i , 1 , 0 y , x ); y ( P ) x ( P y x i i      (3.3)
 , 1 , 0 y , x ); y ( P y ) x ( P x y x i i       (3.4)




0 j i i        (3.5)
  
1
0 i i . b , g i ; u ) x ( dF ) x ( P (3.6)
According to (3.1), the financier’s profits are maximised when the sum of the
borrowers’ expected payoffs and the screening costs is minimised. Condition (3.2)
is the limited liability constraint. Conditions (3.3) and (3.4) restate our
Assumption 2 of the monotonicity requirements for borrowers’ and the financier’s
payoff functions.
Conditions (3.5) and (3.6) are the standard incentive compatibility and the
participation constraints, respectively. According to incentive compatibility
constraints (3.5), type i borrower must receive higher expected payoffs when he
truthfully reveals his type than the expected payoff he would receive if he falsified
his type. The left hand side of (3.5) denotes borrower i’s expected payoffs when
he reports his true type. The right hand side denotes the expected payoffs when he
cheats. With probability 1–j, the cheating is not detected and he receives
payments according to type j’s payoff function. With probability j cheating is
detected and the project is not funded, in which case his payoff is zero.
Participation constraints (3.6), in turn, state that the expected payoffs must be at
least as large as the strictly positive reservation utility u.
3.2 Properties of separating contracts
In this section, we derive a number of lemmas that help us to solve the
optimisation problem (3.1) subject to constraints (3.2)–(3.6). We first show that
the separating contracts have the following properties. First, the participation
constraints bind for both type g and type b borrowers. Second, only type g
borrowers’ incentive compatibility constraints bind. Third, only the borrowers
who claim to be of type b are screened with a positive probability. These
properties are established by the ensuing lemmas.15
First, utilising the auxiliary Lemmas 1 and 2 we show in Lemma 3 that the
type g borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (3.5) binds.
Lemma 1. In a separating equilibrium, if condition (3.5) is a strict inequality for
i, then j is zero.
Proof: Suppose not. In other words, suppose that (3.5) is a strict inequality for i
and j > 0. Then, the financier can offer an alternative contract  ) ), x ( P ( j j
    with
) x ( P ) x ( P j j 
 ,  j j   
 , and 0  <    <  1 for type i. This alternative separating
contract reduces the costs of screening while the incentive compatibility and
participation constraints remain unbinding. Therefore, in a separating equilibrium,
if condition (3.5) is a strict inequality for i, then j is zero. QED
The intuition underlying this lemma is clear. If condition (3.5) is a strict inequality
and  j is positive, then the financier can increase her profits by lowering the
screening probability j. If the decrease in j is small enough, the incentive
compatibility condition for type i remains unbinding. The same argument holds
for any j > 0. Thus, if (3.5) is a strict inequality for i, then j must be zero.
Lemma 2. In a separating equilibrium, if (3.5) is a strict inequality for i, then
(3.6) must be an equality for i.
Proof: Suppose that (3.5) and (3.6) are both inequalities for i. In that case, by




0 i j i i ) x ( dF ) x ( P ) x ( dF ) x ( P . Now, the
financier can offer type i an alternative separating contract  ) ), x ( P ( i i
    with
) x ( P ) x ( P i i 
 , x[0,1] with strict inequality for some x[0,1] and  j j   
 . This
alternative contract increases the financier’s profits without violating the incentive
compatibility and participation constraints. Thus, both (3.5) and (3.6) cannot be
strict inequalities for i. QED
If both (3.5) and (3.6) are strict inequalities for i, then the financier can increase
her profits by lowering payoffs to borrower i. The financier can lower the payoffs
down to the point where either (3.5) or (3.6) becomes binding without violating
the separating equilibrium conditions (3.2)–(3.6).
Lemma 3.  In a separating equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint
(3.5) is binding for i = g.16
Proof: Suppose not, ie suppose that (3.5) is a strict inequality for i = g. Then,






0 b b g b g g u ) x ( dF ) x ( P ) x ( dF ) x ( P ) x ( dF ) x ( P . The first of these
inequalities follows from Lemma 1. The second inequality is due to the
monotonicity of Pb(x) and the first-order stochastic dominance. The third
inequality follows from the participation constraint of type b borrowers. On the
other hand, by Lemma 2, condition (3.6) can now be written as     
1
0 g g u x dF x P .
This is a contradiction. QED
Thus, in a separating equilibrium type g borrowers are indifferent between type g
and type b contracts. This is a standard result in adverse selection models: at least
one type’s incentive compatibility constraint is binding in the separating
equilibrium.
Next, we show that in a separating equilibrium with a menu of contracts,
borrowers claiming to be of type b are screened with positive probability and that
the participation constraints bind for both types of borrowers.
Lemma 4. In a separating equilibrium, b > 0.
Proof: Suppose not. In other words, suppose that b = 0  and  g > 0  (in  a
separating equilibrium with a menu of contracts at least one of the screening
probabilities is positive). By Lemma 3, condition (3.5) for i  =  g can now be




0 g b g g ) x ( dF ) x ( P ) x ( dF ) x ( P . Consider now an alternative pooling
contract  ) x ( P ) x ( P b 
 . The financier earns higher profits with this pooling
contract, since borrowers’ payoffs remain the same while the screening costs
reduce to zero. Thus, b cannot be zero in equilibrium. QED
The above Lemma states that the borrowers claiming to be type b are screened
with positive probability in a separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium
the financier uses its screening technology and the associated penalties (the
financier declines to fund the project) to prevent type g borrowers from pretending
to be type b borrowers. Without screening a positive proportion of type b
borrowers it is impossible to achieve self-selection.
Lemma 5.  In a separating equilibrium, the participation constraint (3.6) is
binding for i = b.
Proof: Consider first the case where information is symmetric. With symmetric
information the financier offers contracts that provide borrowers only their
reservation utility in expected value. That is, the payment schedules Pg(x) and17
Pb(x) satisfy the participation constraints with equality:




0 b b g g u x dF x P x dF x P . With asymmetric information but without
screening these symmetric information contracts are not incentive compatible:
type g borrowers would choose type b contracts and earn expected payoffs in
excess of their reservation utility. Thus, the financier has to use its screening
technology to induce type g borrowers to choose type g contracts. The financier’s
objective is to induce self-selection with as small screening costs as possible. To
minimise the screening costs, the financier has to make type b contracts as
unattractive as possible from the point of view of type g borrowers. It is obvious
that the least attractive b type contracts must satisfy (3.6) as an equality. QED
The above proposition that the participation constraint binds for the lowest quality
type is usual in adverse selection models. Next we establish a more interesting
result. Given our parameter restriction (Assumption 3) the participation constraint
binds also for i = g. Thus, provided that the monitoring cost is sufficiently low, the
financier is able to extract all expected project surpluses in excess of reservation
level from both types of borrowers.
Lemma 6.  In a separating equilibrium, the participation constraint (3.6) is
binding for i = g.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 7. In a separating equilibrium, g = 0.
Proof: By Lemma 6, in a separating equilibrium  
1
0 g g u ) x ( dF ) x ( P . On the other





0 b g g g ) x ( dF ) x ( P ) x ( dF ) x ( P . Therefore, by pretending to be type g borrowers
type b borrowers would not reach their reservation utility in expected value. As a
result, borrowers claiming to be of type g need not be screened, since they indeed
are type g borrowers with certainty. QED
Lemma 8.  In a separating equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint
(3.5) is not binding for i = b.
Proof: Suppose that the incentive compatibility constraint (3.5) is binding for
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follows from the incentive compatibility constraint (3.5) and Lemma 7. The
inequality follows from the definition of the first-order stochastic dominance, and18
the latter equality from Lemma 6. The above chain of equalities and inequalities
contradicts the participation constraint (3.6) for i = b. Consequently, (3.5) cannot
be an equality for i = b in a separating equilibrium. QED
Lemma 7 is in concert with the findings of De Meza and Webb (1988) and Wang
and Williamson (1998). Also in their models only one type of borrowers is
screened. The result of Lemma 8 that the incentive compatibility constraint does
not bind for the lowest quality borrowers is a typical feature of adverse selection
models.
3.3 Characterisation of profit-maximising separating
contracts
In this section we study the structure of profit-maximising separating contracts.
First we derive the profit-maximising contract forms for type b borrowers and
then for type g borrowers.
The financier’s optimisation problem can be simplified by utilising the results
of the previous section. First, since the participation constraints bind for both
types of borrowers (Lemmas 5 and 6), the financier’s expected profits from good
and bad borrowers are essentially fixed at  ) u ( g     and  ) u )( 1 ( b     . Second,
by Lemma 7, g = 0. Using these auxiliary results, the financier’s optimisation
problem (3.1) reduces to a problem of minimising the screening costs (1–)bc
subject to binding participation constraints of both types of borrowers and to the
binding incentive compatibility constraint of type g borrowers (Lemma 8). Thus,
the profit-maximising separating contract for type b is the solution to the
following problem:
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Proposition 1.  A unique profit-maximising contract directed at type b is an
‘inverse debt’ contract with  x (x) P b  ,  ] P [0, x b  ;  b b P (x) P  ,  ,1] P [ x b   for some
) 1 , 0 (  b P .19
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We maximise L with respect to b, Pb(x) and i  0, i = 1,2, subject to feasibility
and monotonicity constraints (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). We immediately notice that
the first-order condition with respect to b implies that 2 < 0. In order to derive
more results, we rewrite (3.9) as
dx ) x ( P ) x ( f ) 1 (
) x ( f
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It can be shown that the other Lagrange constraint is also negative. Suppose
conversely that 1  >  0. Then, the term inside the square brackets in (3.10) is
positive. This, in turn, implies that Pb(x)  =  0 is optimal for all x[0,1]. This
cannot be true, since setting Pb(x) = 0 would violate (3.7). Consequently, both
Lagrange constraints must be negative. Now, examine the term in the square
brackets. Given that 1, 2 < 0 there must exist some values of x[0,1] for which
this term is negative. Otherwise, Pb(x) = 0 is optimal for all x[0,1]. Likewise,
there must exist some values of x[0,1] for which the term in square brackets is
positive. Otherwise, Pb(x)  =  x would maximize L for all x[0,1]. This is
impossible, since it would violate condition (3.7). Because the term in the square
brackets is continuous and increasing in x, there must exist a value  ) 1 , 0 ( x  for
which this term is equal to zero. For    x , 0 x , the term in square brackets is
negative and for    1 , x x  it is positive. Now, given the feasibility and
monotonicity constraints (3.2) and (3.3), we immediately see that the optimal
payoff schedule Pb(x) is Pb(x) = x,    x , 0 x ;  ) x ( P ) x ( P b b  ,  ] 1 , x [ x . Denote
) x ( Pb  by  b P . This completes the proof. QED
By Proposition 1, the profit-maximising separating contract for type b can be
characterised by the pair  ) , P ( b b  , where  b P  corresponds to the gross loan interest
rate in standard loan contracts; only now this payment accrues to a borrower
instead of a financier. Using (3.7) and (3.8)  b P  and b are determined by the
following two equations.
 , u ) P ( F 1 P ) x ( xdF
b P
0 b b b b     (3.11)20
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Simplify the above equations by integrating by parts.
  
b P




    	 
b P
0 g b b dx ) x ( F P ) 1 ( u (3.14)
It is easy to show that there exists a unique pair  ) , P ( b b  , which solves (3.13) and
(3.14). Since (3.13) is continuous and increasing in  b P , there exists a unique  b P
solving (3.13). Inserting this unique  b P  into (3.14) and solving for b yields a
unique solution for b.
Proposition 1 establishes a striking result that the profit-maximising contract
for type b is a mirror image of the standard debt contract. This result is close to
the result of Boyd and Smith (1993). They examine a model with both adverse
selection and costly state verification. They show that in the absence of costly
state verification (only with an adverse selection problem), the equilibrium cannot
have all contracts be debt contracts.
By Proposition 1, the result of Wang and Williamson (1998) of the optimality
of debt is not robust to a change in the market structure. Furthermore, the models
of Innes (1993) and Nachman and Noe (1994) are also likely to fail in the same
robustness test, as their results are based on the same assumptions and
mechanisms as Wang and Williamson (1998).
An intuition of the optimality of the inverse debt contract for type b borrowers
is the following. Inverse debt is the contract that provides borrowers the lowest
payoffs in high-profit states among the contracts that satisfy the feasibility and the
monotonicity constraints and the participation constraint of type b. As high quality
borrowers have more probability weight in high-profit states than low-quality
borrowers, the inverse debt contract is the least attractive feasible and monotonic
type b contract for type g borrowers. Therefore, the inverse debt contract induces
as much self-selection as possible by type g borrowers and minimises the
screening probability b that is needed to induce type g borrowers to truthfully
reveal their types.
The next proposition characterises the properties of profit-maximising
contracts for type g.21
Proposition 2.  Any feasible and monotonic contract that satisfies type g’s
participation constraint (3.6) with equality is the profit-maximising contract
directed at type g.
Proof: By Lemma 6, the participation constraint (3.6) is binding for type g
borrowers in the separating equilibrium. In addition, any feasible and monotonic
contract that satisfies (3.6) with equality is unattractive for type b borrowers (see
the proof of Lemma 7). Thus, any feasible and monotonic contract that satisfies
type g’s participation constraint maximises the financier’s expected returns from
type g borrowers and is unattractive for type b. QED
According to Proposition 2, both debt contracts and inverse debt contracts are
among the continuum of optimal contracts for type g.
So far we have only shown that the contracts characterised in Propositions 1
and 2 are the profit-maximising separating contracts when both types of
borrowers accept the contracts directed at them. However, there are potentially
other separating contracts and pooling contracts that may yield the financier
higher profits. First, there may exist a separating equilibrium, where the financier
offers a single contract that attracts only one type of borrowers. Second, there may
exist a pooling equilibrium, where the financier offers a single contract that
attracts both types of borrowers. The next proposition shows that focusing on a
menu of separating contracts implies no loss of generality as long as the
monitoring cost is sufficiently low.
Proposition 3. When assumption 3 holds, the monopoly financier earns bigger
profits by offering a menu of separating (inverse debt) contracts rather than a
pooling contract that attracts both types of borrowers or a separating contract
that attracts only one type of borrowers.
Proof: See Appendix.22
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we derive the profit-maximising financial contracts in an
environment, where (1) there is one financier and many borrowers, (2) investment
opportunities are heterogeneous, differing in their probability distribution of
returns, (3) type g borrowers’ profit distribution is better than that of type b
borrowers in terms of the monotone likelihood ratio –property, (4) borrowers
know their own types, (5) the net social value of all types of projects is positive,
(6) the type of a firm can be learned only by paying a fixed ex-ante screening cost,
(7) the screening technology permits commitment to stochastic ex-ante screening,
(8) the financier can commit to punish borrowers found guilty of falsifying their
types by denying a loan and (9) project returns are costlessly verifiable.
The main result of this inquiry is the following. When higher quality
borrowers projects are better in the sense of the monotone likelihood property, the
profit-maximising contracts are ‘inverse debt’ contracts. This finding is in contrast
with the results of Wang and Williamson (1998), who establish that the standard
debt is an optimal contract in an otherwise identical model but with a large
number of small and independent financiers. Our results cast doubt on the
robustness of the results of Wang and Williamson (1998), since in reality debt
seems to be a prevalent contract form irrespective of the degree of competition
between financiers.
Furthermore, we argue that also some other adverse selection –based models
of debt may not robust to a change in the market structure (such as Innes 1993 and
Nachman and Noe 1994). These models are based on the same key assumptions as
Wang and Williamson (1998), and, thus, the role of debt is similar. Therefore,
these models are likely to fail in the robustness test that is proposed in this article.23
Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6.  In a separating equilibrium, the participation constraint (3.6) is
binding for i = g.
Proof: With the help of Lemma 3 and Assumption 3, we show that the financier’s
profits are always strictly decreasing with respect to good borrowers’ payoffs.
Then, it is optimal for the financier to lower good borrowers’ expected payoffs to
a level where their participation constraint holds with an equality.
By Lemma 3, from the binding incentive compatibility constraint for type g
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(A1.1)
The first term in (A1.1) denotes the financier’s income from type g borrowers’
projects and the second term from type b borrowers’ projects. The third term
denotes the costs of screening type b borrowers. The fourth term refers to the
costs of screening type g borrowers. At this stage of analysis, we don’t know
whether g is zero or positive in a separating equilibrium. However, we do know
that the derivative of g with respect to EPg is non-negative: as the expected
payoffs to type g borrowers increase, the type g contracts become more attractive
for type b borrowers. This makes the derivative non-negative: as EPg increases,
the screening costs cannot decrease.
To analyse how the financier’s profits behave when she lowers type g
borrowers’ payoffs, we take the derivative of (A1.1) with respect to EPg.
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The sign of this derivative is negative everywhere, if24
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By Assumption 3 and because  0 ) EP ( g g   , this condition is always satisfied.
Thus, since the financier’s profits are decreasing in good borrower’s expected
payoffs, she has an incentive to lower these expected payoffs to the point where
good borrower’s participation constraint is satisfied with an equality. QED25
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. When assumption 3 holds, the monopoly financier earns bigger
profits by offering a menu of separating (inverse debt) contracts rather than a
pooling contract or a separating contract that attracts only one type of borrowers.
Proof: We first derive the forms of profit-maximising pooling contracts and
separating contracts that attract only one type of borrowers. Then, we show that
the separating menu of contracts, characterised in Proposition 1, equation (3.12)
and (3.13) and Proposition 2, provides the financier bigger profits than any
separating contract that attracts only one type of borrowers or any pooling
contract.
Profit-maximising single separating contracts
Instead of the menu of two different separating contracts the financier can
alternatively offer only a single contract that attracts only type g borrowers. The
optimal form of such contract follows from the following basic observations.
First, any contract directed at type g, (Pg(x), 0), where Pg(x) is some monotonic
payoff schedule such that  u ) x ( dF ) x ( P
1
0 g g   , is unattractive for type b borrowers,
since, by the definition of the first-order stochastic dominance,




0 b g    . Second, any contract with  u ) x ( dF ) x ( P
1
0 g g  
maximises the financier’s expected profits among the single separating contracts,
as the financier extracts all the surplus from type g borrowers. The following
result is a consequence of these observations.
Proposition A1. Any contract (Pg(x), 0) with a monotonic payoff schedule Pg(x)
satisfying  u ) x ( dF ) x ( P
1
0 g g    is an optimal separating contract among the
contracts that attract only one type of borrowers.
It is easy to see that the lender’s expected payoff with any such contract is
) k u ( g 1 S       (A2.1)26
Profit-maximising pooling contracts
The analysis of pooling contracts is rather straightforward as there is no screening
in the pooling equilibrium. The monopolistic pooling equilibrium contracts are
characterised by a common payoff schedule P(x). The financier’s problem is to
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1
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The optimal pooling contract maximises the financier’s profits, which is
equivalent with the minimisation problem (), subject to feasibility, monotonicity
and participation constraints (A2.3)–(A2.6).
Proposition A2. The unique optimal pooling contract P(x) satisfies P(x) = Pb(x),
where Pb(x) is characterised by Proposition 1 and equations (3.13) and (3.14).
Thus, the optimal pooling contract is the same inverse debt contract that the
financier offers to type b borrowers in a separating equilibrium with a menu of
contracts. Optimality follows from the fact that this contract provides the financier
the highest possible payoffs from type g borrowers among the contracts that
satisfy type b borrower’s participation constraint with equality. Thus, the optimal
pooling contract is the least attractive contract from the good borrower’s point of
view among the contracts that give bad borrowers exactly their reservation utility.
The lender’s expected profit from offering the profit-maximising pooling
contract is
k ) u )( 1 ( ) x ( dF ) x ( P b
1
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The first term denotes the financier’s expected payoffs from type g borrowers. In
pooling equilibrium, the lender cannot extract all expected project surpluses from
type g borrowers. The second term denotes the lender’s expected payoffs from
type b borrowers, from whom the lender is able to extract all expected project
surpluses.
Comparison of different contracts
In this section we compare the financier’s expected profits under the three
different cases. Let us start the comparison by defining the lender’s profits from
offering a menu of separating contracts.
k
) x ( dF ) x ( P
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1 ) 1 ( c ) u )( 1 ( ) u ( 1
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,( A 2 . 8 )
2 S   denotes the financier’s expected profits when she offers an optimal menu of
two separating contracts, and the borrowers choose the contracts directed at them.
The first two terms denote the financier’s expected returns from type g and b
borrowers, respectively. The third term denotes the screening costs of screening a
fraction of type b borrowers, where the probability of screening is obtained from
the binding incentive compatibility constraint of type g borrowers.
Now, it is easy to show that both differences  1 S 2 S     and  P 2 S     are
positive when Assumption 3 holds. This completes the proof. QED28
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